Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1974

Securities Regulation – Failure to File Prospectus – Validity of
Contract – Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy
Stanley M. Beck
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Source Publication:
Canadian Bar Review. Volume 52, Number 4 (1974), p. 589-598.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Beck, Stanley M. "Securities Regulation – Failure to File Prospectus – Validity of Contract – Exclusiveness
of Statutory Remedy." Canadian Bar Review 52.4 (1974): 589-598.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Osgoode Digital Commons.

COMMENTS
COMMENTAI

FIS

SECURITIES REGULATION-FAILURE TO FILE PROSPECTUS
VALIDITY OF CONTRACT-EXCLUSIVENESS OF STATUTORY REMEDY.-Canadian securities legislation is strangely silent on the civil
consequences of non-compliance with the provision that is central
to each statute-the duty to file and obtain clearance for a prospectus before securities may be sold to the public .' The point came
squarely before the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Ames et
al. v. Investo-Plan Ltd. et al.' but the result, unfortunately, was
an ill-reasoned decision that does little to aid in the task of securities regulation and sheds no light on a murky corner of contract
law.
The facts'in Ames were that the plaintiff was sold shares in
a mutual fund, the Performance Plus Fund, by salesmen employed
by the Fund's management and distribution company, Investo
Plan Limited . A prospectus for the Fund had been filed and
cleared in Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Quebec, but not in
ritish Columbia where the plaintiff resided . Prospectuses were
filed in that province in 1968 and again in 1970 but the Securities
Commission had refused clearance on both occasions . The plaintiff brought an action for rescission . Section 37 of the Securities
Act, 1967,$ provides that:
No person or company shall trade in any security issued by a person or
company either on his own account or on behalf of any other person
or company where the trade would be in the course of primary distribution to the public of the security until there has been filed with
and accepted by the Commission a prospectus in respect of the offering
of the security and a receipt therefor in writing has been obtained from
the Commission.
The trial judge granted rescission on the basis "that the contract
' R.S.A., 1970, c. 333 ; s. 35; S.B.C., 1967, c. 45, s. 37; R.S.M., 1970,
c. S-50, s. 35 ; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 205, s. 13; R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 349, s. 11;
R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 280, s. 12; R.S.®., 1970, c. 426, s. 35; R.S.P.E.Y ., 1951,
c. 146,
s. 8 ; R.S.Q., 1964, c. 274, ss 50, 53; S.S., 1967, c. 81, s. 42.
a (1973), 35 D.L.R.
(3d) 613 (B.C.C.A.) .
3 Supra, footnote 1.
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was void ab initio as being prohibited by statute"' The Court of
Appeal reversed on the ground that the only penalty for failing,
to comply with the prospectus section was that provided by the
statute itself-which in this case was a fine of not more than
$2,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
It is basic legal doctrine that a contract that is expressly or
impl:edly prohibited by statute is illegal. A contract may be illegal
as formed in the sense that the prohibited act is central to the
contract, or illegal as performed in the sense that a lawful contract
is performed in a prohibited manner,' A contract that is illegal
as formed is said to be void ab initio. "It is a complete nullity
under which neither party can acquire rights whether there is an
intention to break the law or not ."' Whether or not this is an
accurate statement of the law-and it will be suggested that it is
broader than the actual results of the cases allow, it is clear that
to decide that a contract is prohibited by statute is radically to
alter the r ghts and liabilities of the parties and possibly to impose hardship on an innocent party. Thus it is imperative, particularly in a time of proliferating regulation of commercial conduct,
that the courts not take a mechanistic approach to statutory
provisions that could be construed as prohibitory' but rather
should consider carefully the scope and character of the statute
as a whole and of the particular section in context.' The conclusion
that a statute is for the protection of the public should not be the
end of the analysis ; contractual relationships should only be inter'Ames and Mickelson v . Investo-Plan Limited and Performance Plus
Fund Limited, [1972] 3 W .W.R . 443, at p . 447, 25 D .L .R. (3d) 581, per
Anderson J . His Lordship also based his judgment on the fact that there
had, by silence, been what amounted to a fraudulent representation. He
also found that there had been a misrepresentation by the furnishing to
the plaintiff of a prospectus that had been cleared in Quebec, making it
appear that the securities had been approved for distribution in British
Columbia .
' Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (8th ed., 1972), pp . 312352 . Contrast Cope v. Rowlands (1836), 2 M. & W. 149, 150 E.R. 707
(illegal as formed) with Anderson, Ltd. v. Daniel, [1924] 1 K .B . 74 (illegal as performed) .
"Cheshire and Fifoot, op . cit ., ibid ., p. 314 . See also Risk, Recent Developments in Contract in Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures
(1966), p. 207, at p, 208 where the basic rule is elaborated upon and given
a more accurate formulation.
'Kingshot v. Brunskill, [1953] O .W .N . 133 (C .A.) is an example of
such a mechanistic approach that led to an unduly harsh and unnecessary
result .
'The thoughtful judgment of Devlin J., in St . John Shipping Corporation
v. Joseph Rank Ltd., [1957] 1 Q .B . 267 is a model of such an approach .
See also Devlin L .J .s judgment in Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v . S. Spanglett Ltd ., [1961] 1 Q.B . 374 where he said : "I think that the purpose of this
statute is sufficiently served by the penalties prescribed for the offender ;
the avoidance of the contract would cause grave inconvenience and injury
to innocent members of the public without furthering the object of the
statute ." At p . 390 .
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fered with if the court is satisfied that it is essential to the legislation's object to do so . The difficulty with the judgment of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Ames is not that it takes
a mechanistic approach, but rather that it purports to examine
the purpose of the legislation and then by parsing its provisions
reaches a result that is not required by the language of the statute
and is inimical to its basic purpose. .
The trial judge in Ames had relied upon the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in McAskill v. The Northwestern Trust
Company' in declaring the contract void . McFarlane J.A., writing
for a unanimous Court of Appeal, was of the opinion that McAskill
was distinguishable for the reasons given by Martland J. in the
Supreme Court's later decision in Meyers v. Freeholders Oil Company Limited." In McAskill the relevant sections of the Manitoba
Sale of Shares Acts' provided that "It shall hereafter be unlawful . . ."lZ
and "It shall not be lawful . . ." 13 to sell securities in
Manitoba without obtaining registration to sell and without filing
papers equivalent to the modern day prospectus . The Supreme
Court held- that à sale of shares by a company that failed to
comply with either provision was void - `

Taking into consideration . the character of the statute, its language and
also the purpose for which it was enacted-which was to protect the
general public against schemes or campaigns to sell shares or securities
of doubtful value to unwary investors . . . the conclusion seems inevitable . . . that anything done in contravention of its prohibitions is
void and not merely voidable.

McFarlane J.A . was of the opinion that provisions of the
British Columbia Securities Act were "substantially different" and
that McAskill was therefore "not determinative" ." Moreover, he
noted that in Meyers, the Supreme Court had held that a sale in
contravention of section 17(a) of the Security Frauds Prevention
Act of Saskatchewan was valid and that the only consequence of
violation was potential liability to the statutory penalty.
This summary dismissal of McAskill by reason of the holding
in Meyers, and the interpretation of Meyers itself, fails to appreciate the reasoning and rationale of both cases . The relevant pro
vision of the Security Frauds Prevention Act" that had been
contravened in Meyers was one that prohibited salesmen, whether
registered or not, from calling at any residence to sell securities .
s

[19261 S .C.R. 412, [19261 3 D .L.R . 612 .
'° [19601 S.C
.R . 761, 25 D .L .R . (2d) 81 .
' 1 R .S .M., 1913, c. 175 .
'z
's

Ibid ., s. 4.
Ibid ., s . 6 .

"Supra, footnote 9, per Mignault J ., at pp . .430-431 (S .C .C.) .
Supra, footnote 2, at p . 616 .
Is R.S .S ., 1940, c . 287, as am .

's
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Martland J. considered the character and purpose of the legislation
as a whole and of section 17 (a) in particular and held that it was
not the intention of the Act to render a contract void because it
was made when a salesman called at a residence . The purpose of
section 17(a) was seen, quite properly it is suggested, as not preventing trading of an unauthorized kind but as "intended to prevent persons in their own residence from being sought out there by
stock salesmen" . "It seeks to deter salesmen from attempting to
make contracts, which otherwise may be quite proper, at a
particular place."" The statute as a whole was undoubtedly for the
protection of the public, but as an independent matter there were
no compelling reasons of policy that required the nullifying of
contracts made in breach of section 17 (a) and Martland J. so held.
Martland J. began his analysis of the problem with the commonplace but accurate observation that the effect of a breach of
a statutory provision upon a contract is often a difficult question .
If the statute forbids the making of a certain kind of contract "the
contract cannot be valid if it is in breach of the provision" . This
his Lordship considered to be the case in McAskill where the
relevant sections provided "It shall hereafter be unlawful . . ."
and "It shall not be lawful . . ."" and dealt with the fundamental
requirements of registration to trade and filing a prospectus.
As to the securities legislation before him, Martland J. characterized its intent as ". . . to afford protection to the public against
trades in securities by persons seeking to trade who have not
satisfied the Registrar as to their proper qualification so to do " .`s
Hence the general registration provisions of section 3 . But section
17(a) was not considered to be "part of, this general pattern".
Thus neither the purpose of the statute nor the wording of the
particular section required the conclusion that its breach rendered
a contract either void or voidable. It is a reasonable inference
from Martland J.'s judgment that if the breach had been of the
mandatory registration requirement of section 3 that his Lordship
would have held that there was an implied statutory prohibition'
and that the contract was void. And this would have been consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in McAskill and, it is
suggested, a proper judicial fulfillment of the central legislative
purpose to prohibit unauthorized trading in securities. So far from
giving support to the decision in Ames, the reasoning in Meyers,
"Supra, footnote 10, per Martland J., at p. 93 (D.L.R.), emphasis
added.
"Sale of Shares Act, supra, footnote 11, ss 4 and 6.
'" Supra, footnote 10, at p. 93 (D.L.R.) .
2° Section 3 of the Securities Fraud Prevention Act, supra, footnote 16,
begins "No person shall . . .".
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and its distinguishing of McAskill, would seem to lead to an
exactly opposite conclusion .
It is difficult to know exactly what McFarlane Y.A. meant by
saying that the statutory provisions in question in Ames were
"substantially different" than those in McAskill . The cornerstone
of securities legislation is the requirement to file and receive
clearance for a prescribed form of disclosure document, a prospectus, before securities may be sold to the public . It was this
provision that was violated in both Ames and McAskill . To suggest, as McFarlane J.A. appears to have done, that the substantive difference between the relevant section in the Manitoba Act'
and section 37 of the British Columbia Securities Act resides in
the difference between the words "It shall not be lawful . . ." and
"No person or company shall trade . . ." is to substitute scholasticism for intelligible judicial interpretation. It may be possible
to say that the former expression constitutes an express prohibition while in the latter the prohibition must be implied. But this
accident of draftsmanship should have no bearing on the civil
consequence of failing to comply with the crucial requirement of
legislation whose entire purpose is to create a regulatory scheme
for the protection of the investing public.
part from section 37, McFarlane J.A . examined the legislation's "more important provisions". These were section 51 which
prohibits primary distribution to the public until the Securities
Commission has been notified ; section 60 which requires delivery
of a prospectus to a prospective purchaser; section 61 which gives
a right of rescission for non-delivery of a prospectus ; section 62
which gives a ninety day right of rescission for an untrue statement
of a material fact in a prospectus ; and section 134 which makes
any contravention of the Act or regulations a summary conviction
offence . His (Lordship concluded that "it is evident" that the object
of the statute is to protect the public but "the statute does not
prohibit trading in securities. or declare contracts for sale of the
." It is true that the statute does not, in

shares void or unlawful
terms, declare contracts void, but it is difficult to accept the conclusion that trading in securities is not prohibited or that contracts
entered into in contravention of section 37 are not unlawful.
Section 37, to repeat, states that "No person or company shall
trade in any security . . . until there has been filed with and accepted by the Commission a prospectus . . .". Section 134 makes
a violation of section 37 a summary conviction offence. With
respect, it seems reasonably clear that the statutory scheme is to
prohibit and make unlawful a trade in securities that does not
21
22

Supra, footnote 11 .
Supra, footnote 2, at p. 618.
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comply with section 37.23 The purpose and particulars of the legislation considered in McAskill were not distinguishable in terms of
the issue that was before the court in Ames and, consistent with
the analysis given of it in Meyers, McAskill should have been
followed .
McFarlane J.A. took further support for his conclusion that
non-compliance with section 37 did not invalidate the contract
from the fact that sections 60, 61 and 62 deal specifically with a
purchaser's right to rescind . But as his Lordship recognized,
those sections deal with situations to which section 37 applies;
section 61 deals with non-delivery of a prospectus to a purchaser
and section 62 with a material non-disclosure in a prospectus. Sections 61 and 62 do not deal with the consequences of violating
section 37 and there is no warrant for the conclusion that the
remedies given by those sections provide a conclusive answer to
the question of the consequences of a breach of section 37 itself.
There is, however, another way in which sections 60 and 61 might
have applied to the instant case. McFarlane J.A. appeared to be
of the opinion that the phrase ". . . a security to which section 37 is
applicable . . ." in section 60 refers to cases in which section 37 has
in fact been complied with. But this is not necessarily the only, or,
it is suggested, the preferable interpretation.
A situation to which section 37 is applicable is simply a
situation in which securities are in primary distribution (as defined)
to the public and a prospectus is required to be filed and cleared.
Section 60 requires that the prospectus be delivered to each purchaser in the primary distribution and section 61 gives a right of
rescission if such delivery is not made. A primary distribution may
well take place even though section 37 has not been complied with
(as in Ames) but it is nonetheless the distribution of ". . . a
security to which section 37 is applicable . . .". In such a case
section 60 has not and could not be complied with and the rescission rights of section 61 should apply."` It would be anomalous if
a right of rescission were given under section 61 where a prospectus
had been filed and cleared but not delivered but was not given
for non-delivery because a prospectus had never been filed in the
first place. Support for a right of recission can be taken from subsection 4 of section 60 which says, in effect, that the section
23
To have held that section 37 implied a prohibition would have been
consistent with the leading case of Cope v. Rowlands, supra, footnote 4,
and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Brown v. Moore
(1902), 32 S.C.R . 93 .
24
The Securities Acts of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario,
supra, footnote 1, have provisions virtually identical to sections 60, 61 and
62 of the British Columbia Securities Act and the same argument would
apply to those statutes .

1974]

Comments

595

does not apply unless the securities are in primary distribution. This
subsection would not be necessary if the section only applied where
a prospectus had in fact been filed for such a filing is only required
when there is a primary distribution . McFarlane J.A. did not consider the point but merely concluded that "Neither of these sections
assists the respondents".
McFarlane J.A . was also concerned about the effect of declaring the sale of shares void . Such a result would ". . . allow companies which agree to issue shares in violation of section 37 to:
escape their obligations to perform their agreements"." The effect
of declaring a contract to be void is one of the most confused
areas in contract law. The statement in Cheshire and Fifoot that
a contract void ab initio ". . . is a complete nullity under which
neither party can acquire rights . . ."26 is, with great respect, simply
too broad. A preferable formulation that leads to a more just and
sensible result, is to say that an illegal contract is unenforceable
by the party who contravened the statute. The judgment of the
Privy Council in Kiriri Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Dewain" does not go
that far but it does provide the basis for substantial relief to an
innocent party to an illegal contract .
In giving the Board's judgment, Lord penning pointed out that
the basic principle stated by Lord Ellenborough that "what is
done in contravention of an Act of Parliament, cannot be made
the subject matter of an action"," was made in a case in which one
of the parties was seeking to enforce an illegal contract . The broad
principle must, according to Lord Denning, be confined to such
a situation of positive enforcement. Lord penning then examined
the other leading cases" in the area and concluded that as long as
the illegal transacion has not been fully executed the court will
entertain a suit for recovery of the money paid or property transferred . Even if the contract has been fully executed, the court will
entertain such a suit so long as the plaintiff is not in pari delicto
with the defendant."
2e
26
Supra, footnote
p. 618 .
Op. cit., footnote 5, p. 314.
27 [1960] A.C . 192 2,(Pat.C.) .
21 Langton v. Hughes (1813) . 1 M. & s. 593, 105 E.R. 222.
29 Hastelow v. Jackson (1828), 8 B. & C. 221, 107 E .R . 1026 ; Taylor
v. Bowers (1876), 1 Q.B .D . 291 ; Petherpermal Chatty v. 11'Iuniatrdi Servai
(1908), L.R . 35 I.A. 98 ; Herman v. Jenchner (1885), 15 Q.B .D . 561;
Lowry v. Bourdieu (1780), 2 Doug. K.B . 468, 99 E.R . 299.
"Supra, footnote 27, at pp . 202-203 . As to when parties are in part
delicto, Lord Denning noted that it is not correct to say that everyone
is presumed to know the law. The true proposition is that no man can
excuse himself from doing his duty by pleading ignorance of the law. Most
importantly he held that if as between two persons "the duty of observing
the law is placed on the shoulders of the one rather than the other-it
being imposed on him specially for the -protection of the other-then they
are not in pari delicto and the money can be recovered back . . :', at p.
204. This, of course, was exactly the situation in Ames.
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On the principles enunciated in Kiriri Cotton, if the contract
in Ames had been held to be illegal and therefore void, the plaintiff could quite properly have brought an action for money had
and received and would have been entitled to succeed, as indeed
he did at trial." It is true, as McFarlane J .A. observed, that to hold
the contract void would be to allow the wrongdoers to escape their
obligations. But this has been the case at least since 1775 when
Lord Mansfield declared that the overriding policy of the law was
not to enforce illegal contracts." And surely in a case like Ames
this is a more imagined than real consequence. It would be the
rare case indeed where the purchaser would wish to sue for specific performance. And the vendor usually would be only too pleased
to deliver the unqualified securities if the contract were still executory. The real consequence of not declaring the contract illegal
is that the innocent purchaser is left without his action for money
had and received and, in effect, without any effective remedyat least on the British Columbia Court of Appeal's view of the
total effect of the Securities Act. As for the wrongdoing seller, he
can come into a province and do an illegal distribution of securities
at the small risk of a maximum penalty cost of $2,000 .00. Moreover, the real absurdity of the effect of the Court of Appeal's
judgment is that a seller who has failed to comply with the central
section of a statute whose whole purpose is to protect the investing public may maintain an action for breach of contract against
his purchaser.
It would have been preferable if Lord Denning in Kiriri Cotton
had narrowed Lord Ellenborough's principle even further and held
that a prohibited contract may not be enforced by the wrongdo
ing party. This, in effect, would make illegal contracts not void but
voidable at the option of the innocent party." It is submitted that
a' Supra, footnote 4. Anderson J. ordered the successful plaintiffs to
restore the shares to the vendors. This ought not to be seen as indirectly
enforcing an illegal contract (see e.g. Kasunns v. Baba-Egbe, [1956) A.C .
539) but rather as the imposition of the requirement that he who seeks
equity must do equity-and the action for money had and received has
been characterized as an equitable remedy notwithstanding that it was
originally a common law remedy in quasi-contract ; see Note (1956), 72
L.Q. Rev. 480. Apar t from any common law-equity distinction the requirement that the plaintiff return the shares is consistent with modern
principles of unjust enrichment ; see Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (1966), pp . 304-306.
"Holman v. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp . 341, 98 E.R . 1120 .
"The Ontario Court of Appeal appeared to take this position in
Lundev v. Broadway Coffee Co . Ltd. . [19351 O.R . 278, at p. 284, [1935)
2 D.L .R . 417. However, it is fairly clear that Masten J.A . meant "voidable
at the option of the purchaser" to mean that the innocent purchaser of
securities is entitled to recover his money back "notwithstanding the general
rule that the court will not lend its aid to recover money paid under an
illegal contract . . ." at p, 284 (O .R .) . Even this, however, is an important
and sensible modification to the often rigid application of the supposed
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this is a preferable policy choice and does no violence to the object
of the law in the vast majority of cases where a statute or regulation
prohibits certain commercial conduct. In a fact situation such as
Ames is not the policy of the law served by allowing the innocent
purchaser to enforce his contract if he so chooses while denying the
aid of the court to the wrongdoing vendor? The purpose of statutory regulation and individual equity is best served by refusing to
aid the wrongdoer and subjecting him to penal sanction while
leaving the innocent party his choice of maintaining the status
quo, enforcing the contract if not fully executed, or rescinding
and seeking restitution through an action for money had and
received . This position was reached by the California Supreme
Court as long ago as 1932. 3 ' Prior to that time it was held that
where securities were issued without filing a prospectus the innocent purchaser could not enforce his contract . The modern and,
it is suggesed, preferable principle was stated in Robins v. Pacific
Eastern Corporation : 35

In spite of the general language found in some of the cases that stock
issued in violation of the Corporate Securities Act is "void", it is well
settled that the act belongs to that type of statute which is aimed at one
class for the protection of another class. In other words, the prohibitions and penalties of the Corporate Securities Act are levelled against
the seller and not against the buyer.

There can be no criticism of a court's desire to scrutinize carefully the general purpose and particular provisions of legislation
and regulations before deciding that there is an implied prohibi- .
tion and that the resultant contract is illegal. Indeed, if there is
any complaint it is that the courts have been too quick to find a
prohibition where such a legislative intent probably never existee
and is not mandated by the particular scheme of commercial
regulation. But such is not the case with the prospectus filing requirement of modern securities legislation where the entire regulatory framework depends upon compliance with that central proeffects of an illegal contract. The judgment in Kiriri Cotton, supra, footnote
27, takes the same position.
34
Eberhard v. Pacific Southwest L. & IRS. Corp . (1932), 9 P. (2d) 302.
(1937), 65 P. (2d) 42, at, p. 61 . See generally Dahlquist, Regulation
and Civil Liability under the California Securities Act: 111 (1946), 34 Cal.
L. Rev. 543, at pp . 551-554. See also the thoughtful comment of Dawson
and Palmer, Cases on Restitution (2nd ed . 1950, p. 1018 :
"The decisions on restitution in connection with illegality leave much
to be desired. The maxim that the law will not aid a party to an illegal
transaction is certainly not universally observed, but it is observed too
often, without taking account of the seriousness of the illegality, the
nature of the plaintiff's participation, the individual injustice of the
enrichment, and whether a judgment denriving the defendant of that
enrichment will subvert the policies underlying the rules of law that
make the transaction illegal."
11 Risk, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 212.
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vision . In a case of non-compliance such as Ames there is every
reason to hold that the purpose of the legislation and the protection
of the public require that such contracts be declared prohibited
and illegal and therefore voidable at the option of the purchaser."
STANLEY M. BECK`

CHARITY-CY-PRÉS-SUPERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY.-When Frances Hunter died in 1944, she left a will in which she required
her executors to hold one half of her residuary estate on trust
for her son, Douglas, during his life, and on his death to' divide
the capital equally "amongst the following [three named] charities" .
One of these was "the Government of the Province of British
Columbia for the Anti-Tuberculosis Sanitarium at Tranquille,
British Columbia". When Frances died in 1944 the provincial
government was still operating this sanatorium, but in 1958 the
institution was closed and thereafter the government used the
buildings for other purposes . This was therefore the state of
affairs when Douglas died in 1970 . The question then arose as
to what should happen to the capital share that was to have gone
to the Tranquille Sanatorium . The Crown wished to have it
applied to some similar object by way of a cy-près scheme, but
the next-of-kin asserted a claim, so the executors took out an
originating notice to have the matter decided.'
The law in this area is not easy, but it is fairly well laid down.
Before the court can approve a cy-près scheme, it must be shown
that the testator's charitable purpose was impossible to carry out
or impracticable, and that he did not have only that particular
charitable purpose in mind, but a general intent to give to charitable work of that kind . It is because the testator had this so-called
general charitable intent that the court will assist his intention by
seeing that the property is applied to some similar purpose. If he
only wanted to further the particular named charitable purpose,
but impossibility or impracticability has occurred, the court will
not intervene, and the property in question will revert to his estate .
"Bill 75, The Securities Act, 1974, 4th session, 29th Legislature, Ontario, 23 Eliz . 11, 1974, gives the purchaser a right of rescission or damages
in such cases. See s. 125.
* Stanley M. Beck, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto. Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, 1975 . The author also
serves as a Commissioner of the Ontario Securities Commission . The views
expressed are solely those of the author .
Re Hunter, [19731 3 W.W.R . 197, 34 D.L .R. (3d) 602. The institution
was known as a sanatorium, S.B .C ., 1921, c. 27 and not as a sanitarium,
which was the spelling used in the will .

